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Appellant Robert Waterman was sentenced to 15 
months’ imprisonment after he pled guilty to the charge of 
destruction of records in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519. 
Waterman contends that the District Court erred in applying a 
three-level sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. 
§ 2J1.2(b)(2) for substantial interference with the 
administration of justice. We hold that the District Court’s 
application of the enhancement was not clear error and, 
accordingly, will affirm. 
I. 
 Waterman was a police officer with the Pennsville, 
New Jersey Police Department from July 2006 until his 
resignation in October 2011. In August 2008, Waterman 
disclosed to a supervising officer that he had downloaded 
approximately twenty videos containing child pornography to 
his home computer. FBI agents were made aware of 
Waterman’s 2008 admissions, opened an investigation, and 
interviewed Waterman on March 4, 2010 at his residence. 
Waterman told the FBI that the computer he used to view 
child pornography crashed in 2008 and that he threw out the 
“fried” hard drive in August 2008. 
 On March 5, 2010, Waterman’s superior approached 
him at police headquarters and asked him to remain in the 
office to wait for the chief of police. Waterman did not 
remain in his office, but instead went outside to his patrol car. 
Waterman’s superior found him in his vehicle, breaking apart 
what was determined to be a green printed circuit board.1 
                                              
1 “Hard drive” refers to the data platters contained within the 
sealed hard drive housing, which is attached to the green 
printed circuit board. Because a circuit board can be replaced 
and damage to the circuit board does not destroy the data in 
the hard drive, the Government conceded that the destruction 
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After searching the vehicle, officers recovered a pried-open 
damaged hard drive on top of Waterman’s patrol bag and 
found a small screwdriver and hammer in the side pocket. 
When asked whether this hard drive contained child 
pornography, Waterman responded that there was a 50/50 
chance that it did because he had two hard drives, one that he 
threw out and one that he kept. Later that day, FBI agents 
again interviewed Waterman at his home, whereupon he 
explained that he had found the hard drive in his garage after 
his initial interview with the FBI. Two experts later examined 
the hard drive in an effort to recover the data, but the damage 
was beyond repair. The experts concluded that the hard drive 
had been pried open and the hard drive platters had been 
scratched. They concluded that the damage was consistent 
with damage caused by a foreign instrument such as a 
screwdriver.  
 On January 8, 2013, Waterman pled guilty to a one-
count indictment charging him with destruction, alteration or 
falsification of records in a federal investigation in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1519. At sentencing, the District Court found 
that there was sufficient evidence that Waterman destroyed 
the hard drive on March 5, 2010, after he learned of the FBI 
investigation. The District Court concluded that destruction of 
the hard drive resulted in the early termination of the FBI 
investigation and the unnecessary expenditure of substantial 
governmental resources. Accordingly, the District Court 
adopted the Presentence Investigation Report and applied a 
three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(2) for 
substantial interference with the administration of justice. The 
                                                                                                     
of the circuit board, while sufficient for a conviction under 18 
U.S.C. § 1519, was insufficient for an enhancement under 
§ 2J1.2(b)(2). App. 54. 
 5 
 
enhancement resulted in an adjusted offense level of 16 and a 
criminal history category of I, which corresponded to 21 to 27 
months’ imprisonment. Without the § 2J1.2(b)(2) 
enhancement, Waterman’s adjusted offense level would have 
been 13, with an advisory Guidelines range of 12 to 18 
months’ imprisonment. 
 At the sentencing hearing, the District Court conducted 
a thorough examination of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. It 
considered letters from Waterman’s friends, family and 
coworkers attesting to his moral character. The District Court 
noted Waterman’s exemplary military service, personal work 
ethic, and dedication to his children. It also considered the 
serious nature of the crime and the general need to deter 
others from future similar conduct. After considering these 
factors, the District Court found that a sentence within the 
Guidelines range would not be appropriate given the 
“extraordinary personal characteristics of this defendant.” 
App. 100. Accordingly, the District Court granted a six-
month downward variance and sentenced Waterman to 15 
months’ incarceration. Waterman timely appealed.2 
II. 
Waterman contests the District Court’s application of 
an enhancement for substantial interference, contending that 
there was insufficient evidence for the District Court to find 
that he destroyed the hard drive on March 5, 2010. Waterman 
argues that the District Court clearly erred because the 
Government failed to sufficiently prove the applicability of 
the § 2J1.2(b)(2) enhancement. Because we hold that the 
                                              
2 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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District Court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous, 
we will affirm. 
“We review the District Court’s factual findings 
relevant to the Guidelines for clear error and exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s interpretation of the 
Guidelines.” United States v. West, 643 F.3d 102, 105 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). “A finding is clearly erroneous 
when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
body on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States 
v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Concrete 
Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust 
for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993)). “Where there are two 
permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice 
between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. 
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).  
Under U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(2), “[i]f the offense resulted 
in substantial interference with the administration of justice, 
increase by 3 levels.” Application Note 1 of U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 
states that “‘[s]ubstantial interference with the administration 
of justice’ includes a premature or improper termination of a 
felony investigation; an indictment, verdict, or any judicial 
determination based upon perjury, false testimony, or other 
false evidence; or the unnecessary expenditure of substantial 
governmental or court resources.” A district court applies the 
preponderance of the evidence standard in making factual 
findings regarding disputed Guidelines points. Grier, 475 
F.3d at 568. 
 At the sentencing hearing, the District Court applied 
the substantial interference enhancement and did not “have 
any difficulty determining that Mr. Waterman destroyed the 
platters” on March 5, 2010, after learning of the FBI 
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investigation. App. 76. The District Court noted that, in his 
statement to the probation officer, Waterman said that he 
brought the hard drive to work with the intention of giving it 
to his supervisor. Though Waterman had occasion to turn in 
the hard drive on March 5, he instead left the building and 
was observed destroying the circuit board in his patrol car. 
The District Court also noted that the circumstantial evidence 
was strong because Waterman had the broken hard drive and 
a screwdriver—a tool unnecessary for his job—in his patrol 
bag, and the damage to the hard drive was consistent with 
damage caused by a screwdriver. Based on this evidence, the 
District Court concluded that there was a preponderance of 
evidence that Waterman destroyed the hard drive on March 5, 
2010, and, accordingly, overruled Waterman’s objection to 
the enhancement.  
The District Court did not clearly err in finding that 
Waterman destroyed the hard drive on March 5, 2010. 
Though Waterman argues that no one witnessed him actually 
destroying the hard drive in his squad car, such direct 
evidence is unnecessary. The record shows that Waterman 
was seen destroying the circuit board in his car on March 5, 
2010; the officers found the damaged hard drive in 
Waterman’s squad car along with a screwdriver and hammer; 
the damage caused to the hard drive was consistent with 
damage done with a screwdriver; and Waterman himself 
stated that there was a 50/50 chance that the hard drive 
contained child pornography. Based on the record before us, 
we cannot say we are left with a “definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed.” Grier, 475 F.3d at 570. 
Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not clearly 
err. 
The Government also argues that, even if the District 
Court clearly erred in its application of the enhancement, any 
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error was harmless. Waterman argues otherwise, contending 
that the District Court did not explicitly state that the 15-
month sentence was the only appropriate sentence. Waterman 
also contends that the erroneously calculated offense level 
was a critical reference point for the District Court’s 
downward variance. Our Court has previously noted that, 
“where . . . the district court does not explicitly state that the 
enhancement had no effect on the sentence imposed, it 
usually will be difficult to ascertain that the error was 
harmless.” United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 389 (3d 
Cir. 2013). Because we believe the District Court did not 
clearly err in finding that Waterman destroyed the hard drive 
on March 5, 2010, we need not determine whether the alleged 
error was harmless. 
Finally, in their briefs and at oral argument, Waterman 
and the Government also addressed the issue of whether 
timing is a relevant consideration for district courts applying 
the § 2J1.2(b)(2) enhancement. The Government contends 
that timing is irrelevant to the application of the enhancement, 
noting that courts have applied the enhancement to 
obstructive conduct that occurred well before the initiation of 
a potential judicial proceeding or investigation. See United 
States v. Amer, 110 F.3d 873, 885 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding 
that the substantial interference enhancement properly applied 
to a defendant convicted of abducting his children and 
removing them from the United States, notwithstanding the 
absence of an ongoing proceeding at the time of the 
abduction). We are unconvinced by the Government’s 
assertion. The language of the sentencing enhancement—
mandating that the “offense resulted in substantial 
interference with the administration of justice,” U.S.S.G. 
§ 2J1.2(b)(2) (emphasis added)—imposes a requirement of 
causality. See Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 887-
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88 (2014) (“A thing ‘results’ when it ‘[a]rise[s] as an effect, 
issue, or outcome from some action, process or design.’ 2 The 
New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 2570 (1993). 
‘Results from’ imposes, in other words, a requirement of 
actual causality.”). In determining whether the offense caused 
substantial interference, the timing of the offense in relation 
to the events which give rise to an assertion of substantial 
interference3 is a relevant factor for district courts to consider 
when applying the enhancement. Nonetheless, because our 
holding does not rest on the issue of timing, we need not 
make a determination as to its relevance in this case. 
III. 
 We conclude that the District Court did not clearly err 
in applying the § 2J1.2(b)(2) enhancement for substantial 
interference with the administration of justice based on its 
determination that Waterman destroyed the hard drive on 
March 5, 2010. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
                                              
3 U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 app. n.1 (defining “substantial interference 
with the administration of justice” as including “a premature 
or improper termination of a felony investigation; an 
indictment, verdict, or any judicial determination based upon 
perjury, false testimony, or other false evidence; or the 
unnecessary expenditure of substantial governmental or court 
resources”). 
